Ramsay v Southern NSW Local Health District; Manning v Sydney Trains; Honey v Robert Sheridan Family Trust; Duncan v Department of Education and Magnan v Upper Shire Council (NSWDC 2024)

Link to Decision

Key Takeaways

His Honour Waugh SC DCJ decided in a joint judgment handed down on 7 August 2024 that the Personal Injury Commission (PIC) would not be exercising federal jurisdiction in resolving disputes of the following nature where one of the parties resides in a different State:

• Initial liability – ss4, 9A, 11A, 33, 38 and 60 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act)
• Liability for death benefits – ss 14(3), 25 and 26 of the 1987 Act
• Determination of ‘worker’ – s4 of the Workers Compensation and Workplace Injury Management Act 1998 (the 1998 Act)
• Determination of psychological injury – ss11A(3) and 11A(7) of the 1987 Act
• Lump sum compensation – s66 of the 1987 Act

Each matter was remitted to the PIC for determination.

Brief Facts

The PIC is not a Court and so is not invested with federal jurisdiction by s39 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). This means that it does not have power to decide matters which are federally impacted. That is, matters involving disputes between residents of different States or between a State and a resident of another State per s75(iv) of the Constitution.

Because of this, parties in workers compensation disputes involving a claimant who resides in one state and an employer who is another State or is a resident of another State, find themselves applying to the District Court of New South Wales, or other similar Courts, to determine whether the PIC has jurisdiction to determine their dispute.

In these five matters, Waugh J was asked to consider whether the PIC, in determining each application, would involve an exercise of federal jurisdiction. The Attorney General intervened in these proceedings and held the position that none of the matters involved an exercise of federal jurisdiction. This position was unanimously agreed by all parties.

Judgment

Waugh J referred to the recent decisions of Kanajenahalli v State of New South Wates (Western New South Wales Local Health District) (NSWCA 2023) and Chetty v Queanbeyan-Palerang Regionat Council (NSWDC 2024) which found that determination of workers compensation disputes under s4(b)(i) of the 1987 Act and section 11A(1) of the 1987 Act would not involve exercising judicial power.

Waugh J emphasized the considerations of whether the issue in the workers compensation dispute had close analogy to any issue arising at general law and whether the issue related to a question of fact as esteemed by those cases.

The matter of Ramsay related to issues surrounding injury (ss 4(b)(ii), 9A and 11A(1) of the 1987 Act) and, if there was a compensable injury whether there was an entitlement to weekly benefits (ss33 and 38 of the 1987 Act) and/or to medical or treatment expenses (s60 of the 1987 Act).

Waugh J found that the determinations relating to injury were analogous to determinations under s4(b)(i) of the 1987 Act. Waugh J accepted that calculation of weekly payments based on statutory formulae is not closely analogous any other function of a Court under general law. Waugh J determined that s60 of the 1987 Act required consideration of a factual test.

The matter of Manning related to a disputed death benefits claim; if the injury set out by s4 of the 1987 Act was caused by an intentional self-inflicted injury per s14(3) of the 1987 Act or if death resulted from an injury for the purposes of ss25 and 26 of the 1987 Act.

Waugh J found that the determination of whether death resulted from self-inflicted injury was a fact based inquiry and in the absence of the deceased, did not involve any cross examination or usual rules of evidence. It was found that the determination of dependency under s25 of the 1987 Act was a question of fact and whether death resulted from injury analogous to s4 of the 1987 Act.

The matter of Honey related to a dispute as to whether the claimant was a ‘worker’ (s4 of the 1998 Act) so as to have an entitlement to compensation under ss 33 and 60 of the 1987 Act.

Waugh J reasoned that while the concept of contract for service arises in various areas of common law, the issue of whether the claimant was a ‘worker’ in this case was specific to the operation of the statutory workers compensation regime and his entitlement thereunder and was not directed to any right, duty, power or liability arising at general law.

The matter of Duncan concerned dispute of liability for injury (ss 4, 9A, 11A(3) and 11A(7) of the 1987 Act) and entitlement to weekly benefits (ss32A, 37 and 38 of the 1987 Act) and treatment expenses (ss59 and 60 of the 1987 Act).

Waugh J repeated his views regarding determining issues of injury under s4 and 9A with respect to s11A(3) and (7) of the 1987 Act which defined compensable psychological injury/condition. His Honour accepted that application of the statutory formula under s37 and fixed criteria under s32A of the 1987 Act to determine an entitlement to weekly benefits had no analogy to issues at general law. His Honour repeated his views with respect to s60 of the 1987 Act.  

The matter of Magnan involved an initial liability dispute and also, the issue of whether the worker had entitlement to permanent impairment compensation (s66 of the 1987 Act).

Waugh J found that there are detailed administrative procedures set out in the 1998 Act for determining the degree of permanent impairment and once this was established, s66 of the 1987 Act set out a mathematical calculation for determining compensation payable.

Based on the above reasoning, Waugh J was satisfied that the PIC had jurisdiction to determine each of the issues in dispute as it would be exercising administrative power, rather than judicial power, to do so.

Implications

The joint judgment provides much needed clarity as to what does (and what does not) amount to an exercise of federal jurisdiction in the NSW workers compensation scheme.

It is now clear that if a party to a workers compensation claim resides outside NSW, the PIC has authority to determine issues relating to initial liability, death benefits, lump sum compensation and whether a claimant is a ‘worker’.